Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a symbolic model to analyse protocols that use a bilinear pairing between two cyclic groups. This model consists in an extension of the Abadi-Rogaway logic and we prove that the logic is still computationally sound: symbolic indistinguishability implies computational indistinguishability provided that the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds and that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure. We illustrate our results on classical protocols using bilinear pairing like Joux tripartite Diffie-Hellman protocol or the TAK-2 and TAK-3 protocols.
Introduction
Recently bilinear pairings such as Weil pairing or Tate pairing on elliptic and hyperelliptic curves have been used to build several cryptographic protocols. One of the first usable pairing-based protocol has been designed by Joux in [Jou00] where a key exchange protocol based on pairing is proposed. This protocol allows three participants to build a shared secret key in a singe round. However this protocol was only designed to be secure in the passive setting and is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. Several key exchange protocols that extends this original protocol were developed, either to ensure some form of authentication [ARP03] or to extend it to a group setting [BDS03] . Pairings were also used as a robust building block for other cryptographic primitives such as identity based encryption schemes or signature schemes [DBS04] .
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose an extension of the symbolic model from Dolev and Yao [DY83] for protocols using bilinear pairing and symmetric encryption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time pairings are considered in a Dolev-Yao like model. Moreover we prove that our symbolic model is sound in the computational setting: if there are no attacks in the symbolic setting, then attacks in the computational setting have only a negligible probability of success. This is done by extending the Abadi-Rogaway logic from [AR00] to symbolic terms using pairings. We use classical cryptographic assumptions from Work partly supported by the ARA SSIA Formacrypt.
the standard model to prove soundness: the symmetric encryption scheme has to satisfy indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and the bilinear mapping has to satisfy the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (BDDH). Under these assumptions, our soundness result can be used to prove computational security of protocols such as Joux tripartite Diffie-Hellman protocol [Jou00] or the TAK-2 and TAK-3 protocols from Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03] .
We stick to this passive setting of [AR00] . This setting is restrictive compared to results for active adversaries. However this restriction can be partially removed because as shown by Katz and Yung in [KY03] , it is possible to automatically transform a (key agreement) protocol that is secure in the passive setting into a protocol that is secure in the active setting. Thus in order to design a protocol that is secure in the active case, one can write a protocol that is secure against passive adversaries in the symbolic setting. Our result can be used to prove that this protocol is secure against passive adversaries in the computational setting. Then the Katz and Yung compiler can be used to generate a protocol that is secure against active adversaries in the computational setting.
Related work. This result follows the line of a recent trend in bridging the gap which separates the symbolic and computational views of cryptography. This work started with [AR00,AJ01] where only passive adversaries are considered.
Further works focussed on extending this result by considering the active setting and by adding cryptographic primitives. The active setting has been explored through a very rich and generic framework by Backes et al. in [BPW03] and subsequent papers. The work of Canetti and Herzog [CH04] uses a similar model but add the notion of universal composability. Micciancio and Warinschi later proposed another soundness result for the active case in [MW04b] . They consider a less general framework but in their model automatic verification of protocols in the symbolic model is possible through existing tools. This model was later extended in [CW05, JLM05] in order to remove some of the original limitations and to consider digital signatures.
In the passive setting, numerous cryptographic primitives have been studied. For example, exclusive or and ciphers have been considered in [BCK05] , low entropy passwords which are subject to guessing attacks are studied in [ABW06] , in [GvR06] probabilistic hash functions are used to prove soundness of symbolic hashes and in [ABHS05] a stronger variant of semantic security is used to consider symmetric encryption schemes in presence of key cycles. However we are not aware of any computational soundness result involving pairing-based protocols.
The concept and difficulties of considering pairings are close to those introduced by modular exponentiation. But computational soundness for this primitive has only been considered in a few works. In [GS05] , a logic is used to verify protocols that use modular exponentiation and digital signature. However only two-party protocols are handled. Herzog presents in [Her04] an abstract model for Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols but in this work the adversary is extended with the capability of applying arbitrary polynomial time functions.
Outline of this paper. The next section recalls the necessary definition for bilinear pairings and introduces BDDH security. Section 3 details our symbolic model: terms, deductibility and equivalence are defined in this setting. Then section 4 precises our computational setting by giving concrete semantics to symbolic terms. Our main soundness result is given in section 5: symbolic indistinguishability implies computational indistinguishability for secure cryptographic primitives. Section 6 illustrates this soundness result on some simple protocols using bilinear pairings. Finally a short conclusion is drawn in section 7.
Preliminaries for Pairing
In this section, we briefly recall the basics of bilinear pairings. The formal definition is given in section 4. Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of same prime order q. Let g 1 be a generator of G 1 . We use multiplicative notations for both groups. A mapping e from G 1 × G 1 to G 2 is called a cryptographic bilinear map if it satisfies the three following properties.
-Bilinearity: e(g
xy for any x, y in Z q . -Non-degeneracy: e(g 1 , g 1 ) is a generator of G 2 which is also denoted by g 2 , i.e. g 2 = 1 G2 . -Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u and v in G 1 .
Examples of cryptographic bilinear maps includes modified Weil pairing [BF01] and Tate pairing [BKLS02] : G 1 is a group of points on an elliptic curve and G 2 is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. The traditional notation for group G 1 originates from elliptic curve groups and thus is additive however we stick to multiplicative notations in order to simplify our symbolic model of section 3. The classical decisional security assumption for groups with pairing is the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) assumption. This assumption states it is difficult for an adversary that has access to three elements of G 1 , g . This protocol is an extension of the classical Diffie-Hellman key exchange for three participants. Let A, B and C be the three participants. Each of them randomly samples a value in Z q (denoted by x for A, by y for B and by z for C). Then the three following messages are exchanged:
The shared secret key is g xyz 2 , it is easy to check that A, B and C can compute this key by using the bilinear map e on the two messages that they have received. This protocol is safe in the passive setting provided that the BDDH assumption holds. No form of authentication is provided in this protocol, so it is trivially subject to man-in-the-middle attacks.
In the following sections, our objective is to provide a symbolic model for protocols using bilinear maps and to give a computational justification of this model. We stick to the passive setting but as noted earlier this is not a real restriction thanks to the Katz and Yung compiler [KY03] . As usual the computational setting is parameterized by a security parameter η which can be thought of as the length of keys. Adversaries are probabilistic polynomial-time (in η) Turing machines. By convention, the adversaries considered in this paper are given access implicitly to as many fresh random coins as needed, as well as the complexity parameter η.
The Symbolic Setting
In this section, we introduce the symbolic view of cryptography: messages are represented as algebraic terms, the adversary's capabilities are defined by an entailment relation and an observational equivalence ∼ =. This equivalence is an extension of the well-known Abadi-Rogaway logic to terms using symmetric encryption and pairing. The main difference with the original logic is that we introduce generator g 1 for the first group (G 1 ), and generator g 2 for the second group (G 2 ) as long as an infinite set of names representing exponents.
Terms and Deductibility
Let Keys and Exponents be two countable disjoint sets of symbols for keys and exponents. A power-free 3-monomial is a product of three distinct exponents and a power-free 3-polynomial is a linear combination of monomials using coefficients in Z (with no constant coefficient), hence 2x 1 x 2 x 3 + x 3 x 4 x 5 is a power-free 3-polynomial but x 2 1 x 2 and x 1 x 2 x 3 +1 are not. We let Poly be the set of power-free 3-polynomials with variables in Exponents and coefficients in Z. With a slight abuse of notation, we often refer to power-free 3-monomials as monomials and to power-free 3-polynomials as polynomials.
Let k, x and p be meta-variables over Keys, Exponents and Poly respectively. Polynomials can be exponentiated and the set T of terms is built using symbolic encryption and concatenation of keys, exponents and exponentiations:
Term (t 1 , t 2 ) represents the pair composed of terms t 1 and t 2 , {t} k represents (symmetric) encryption of term t using key k. {t} g p 2 represents encryption of term t using a key derived from g p 2 (there is an implicit application of a deterministic key extraction algorithm Kex which is detailed in the computational semantics), in this case g p 2 is said to occur at a key position. g x 1 and g p 2 represent modular exponentiation of g 1 (generator of the first group) and g 2 (generator of the second group) to the power of an exponent x in the first case and a polynomial p in the second case. An exponent x can be used exponentiated using g 1 or g 2 but can also be used as plaintext.
For any term t, pol (t) designates the set of polynomials that appear in t and mon (t) designates the set of monomials used by polynomials in pol (t).
Equality between polynomials is considered modulo the classical equational theory: associativity and commutativity for addition and multiplication, distributivity of multiplication over addition.
First we define a deduction relation E t where E is a finite set of terms and t is a term. The intuitive meaning of E t is that t can be deduced from E. The deductibility relation is an extension of the classical Dolev-Yao inference system [DY83] :
Note that we did not consider composition rules like if t 1 and t 2 are deductible then (t 1 , t 2 ) is also deductible. Indeed these rules are not necessary as deduction is only used to check whether some key can be deduced from a term. As keys are atomic, it is sufficient to consider the four previous rules. We add four new deduction rules in order to handle pairing. The three first rules correspond to the three possible ways to obtain an exponentiation g xyz 2 using the cryptographic bilinear map:
Note that these three rules correspond to "real" capacities of the adversary in the computational setting. In the first case, an adversary knowing g y 1 and g z 1 can use the bilinear map to produce g yz 2 . As he also knows x he can exponentiate g yz 2 to obtain g xyz 2 . In the second case, the adversary knows y so he can produce g y 1 and act as in the first case. Finally, the third case is also similar, the adversary can compute g After adding these new deductions, the deductibility relation is still decidable. Proposition 1. Let t be a term and E be a finite set of terms. Then deductibility of t from E is decidable.
Equivalence
Well-formed Terms. Equivalence is only defined for terms that make a correct use of the bilinear pairing. Such terms are called well-formed terms. Formally a term t is well-formed if for any distinct monomials m and m in mon (t), m and m do not have any common exponent.
Patterns. Patterns are used to characterize the information that can be extracted from a well-formed term. These patterns are close to those introduced in [AR00, MP05] but are extended in order to handle modular exponentiation. We introduce a new symbol representing a ciphertext that the adversary cannot decrypt. Moreover we consider that the encryption scheme is not necessarily key-concealing hence it could be possible for an adversary to tell that two ciphertexts have been produced using the same key. Let t be a term and K be a finite set of keys and elements of the second group g p 2 , then the pattern of t using K, pat (t, K) is inductively defined by:
The set K is used to store keys that are known by the adversary, for that purpose we use a function K(t) that associates to each term t the set of keys k and exponentiations g p 2 which are subterms of t and deductible from t. Note that we consider k to be a subterm of {m} k and g p 2 to be a subterm of {m} g .
We say that two well-formed terms t 1 and t 2 are equivalent, t 1 ≡ t 2 , if they have the same pattern: t 1 ≡ t 2 if and only if pat (t 1 , K(t 1 )) = pat (t 2 , K(t 2 )). Intuitively patterns hide information that are encrypted with secure keys. Hence two terms have the same pattern if the information that can be extracted are the same, so it is impossible to distinguish these two terms.
Equivalence up to renaming. We allow renaming of keys in a similar way as [AR00] but renaming of polynomials is slightly more complex and is realized through linear relation preserving bijections. Let us illustrate this on the two following examples.
-Let t 1 be the term (x 1
)
. The associated renaming is also:
{x 7 x 8 x 9 → x 1 x 2 x 3 + x 4 x 5 x 6 } This correctly preserves linear relations as g x1x2x3+x4x5x6 2 cannot be obtained from other parts of t 1 (x 1 x 2 x 3 +x 4 x 5 x 6 is not involved in any linear relations) and g x7x8x9 2 cannot be obtained from other parts of t 2 .
Two well-formed terms t 1 and t 2 are equivalent up to renaming, t 1 ∼ = t 2 if they are equivalent up to some renaming of keys and monomials. t 1 ∼ = t 2 if and only if ∃σ 1 a permutation of Keys ∃σ 2 a linear relation preserving renaming from t 2 to t 1 such that t 1 ≡ t 2 σ 1 σ 2
We first define the set dm(t) of deductible monomials from t, i.e. monomials that can be obtained using the bilinear map operation (this is a slight abuse of notation as the monomial itself can be not deductible its exponentiation using g 2 is deductible). A monomial x 1 x 2 x 3 from mon (t) is in dm(t) if one of the following conditions hold:
-Either x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are deductible from t, -or x 1 , x 2 and g x3 1 are deductible from t, -or x 1 , g x2 1 and g x3 1 are deductible from t. Let t 2 and t 1 be two terms, a renaming σ from t 2 to t 1 is linear relation preserving if the same linear relations are verified between polynomials from t 2 and their image using σ. However monomials from dm(t 2 ) cannot be renamed as they are linked to other parts of term t 2 due to the bilinear pairing. Formally, σ has to verify the following condition: ∀p 1 , ..., p n ∈ pol (t 2 ), ∀a 1 , ..., a n ∈ Z, ∀m 1 , ..., m n ∈ dm(t 2 ), ∀b 1 , ..., b n ∈ Z,
In this definition of equivalence, we have not considered renaming of Exponents to preserve simplicity but this can easily be added. Using this new definition, an interesting result is the decidability of equivalence up to renaming.
Proposition 2. Let t 1 and t 2 be two well-formed terms. Equivalence up to renaming of t 1 and t 2 is decidable.
In our symbolic model, we have two important restrictions: elements of the first group have the form g x 1 where x is an exponent and elements of the second group have the form g p 2 where p is a linear combination of monomials of order 3. The first restriction is useful as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is always false on the first group, knowing g x 1 , g y 1 it is easy to distinguish g xy 1 from a random group element by using the cryptographic bilinear map. The second restriction illustrates correct use of pairing. Pairing allows a safe use of keys using monomials of order 3, however this might not be the case for monomials of order different from 3.
Examples
Here we give some examples that illustrate the choices we made when defining the equivalence. These choices are motivated by the possibilities of adversaries in the computational setting. Unlike [AR00], our symbolic model does not include symbolic constants like 0 or 1 as plaintexts. However it is possible to encode these constants using for example two key names k 0 and k 1 . Then 1 denotes k 1 and 0 denotes k 0 and instead of looking at equivalence between t and t , we look at equivalence between (k 0 , k 1 , t) and (k 0 , k 1 , t ).
1. {0} k ∼ = {1} k . This example shows that symmetric encryption perfectly hides its plaintext.
Symmetric encryption also hides equalities among the underlying plaintexts. To achieve this, encryption has to be probabilistic. As modular exponentiation is deterministic, we cannot ask modular exponentiation to hide such relations.
). This example illustrates security of the Joux protocol [Jou00] against passive adversaries. The adversary observes the unfolding of the protocol where three exponentiations are exchanged. These exponentiations allows the three participants to build a shared secret key g . Then the adversary cannot distinguish the shared key from a randomly sampled element of the second group g
(as the order of the group is prime, g
has a uniform distribution over elements of the second group). Moreover the symbolic setting can be used to verify that each participant is able to compute the shared key. For example the first participant generates exponent x 1 and receives g x2 1 and g x3 1 from the second and third participants. Using this knowledge, he is able to compute the shared secret key as
). This example combines the Joux protocol with an exchange of secret information using the shared key. Thus in this example symmetric encryption and bilinear pairing are used simultaneously.
The Computational Setting
In this section, we formalize the mapping between symbolic terms and distributions of bit-strings. This mapping depends on the algorithm used to implement the two cryptographic primitives used in the symbolic setting: symmetric encryption and pairing.
Encryption Scheme
We recall the standard definition for symmetric encryption schemes. A symmetric encryption scheme SE is defined by three algorithms KG, E and D. The key generation algorithm KG takes as input the security parameter η and outputs a key k. The encryption algorithm E is randomized, it takes as input a bit-string s and a key k and returns the encryption of s using k. The decryption algorithm D takes as input a bit-string c representing a ciphertext and a key k and outputs the corresponding plaintext. Given k ← KG(η), we have that for any bit-string s, if c ← E(k, s) then it is required that D(c) = s.
In order to characterize security of a symmetric encryption scheme, we use the classical IND-CPA (indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks) notion [GM82] .
IND-CPA security. In this paper we use schemes that satisfy length-concealing semantic security
1 . The definition that we recall below uses a left-right encryption oracle LR b SE . This oracle first generates a key k using KG. Then it answers queries of the form (bs 0 , bs 1 ), where bs 0 and bs 1 are bit-strings. The oracle returns ciphertext E(bs b , k). The goal of the adversary A is to guess the value of bit b. His advantage is defined as:
Encryption scheme SE is IND-CPA secure if the advantage of any adversary A is negligible in η. The difference with the standard notion of semantic security is that we require that the scheme hides the length of the plaintext (and therefore we do not restrict bs 0 and bs 1 to have equal length). By abuse of notation we call the resulting scheme also IND-CPA secure.
Pairing
A bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm IG which given a security parameter η outputs a tuple (q, G 1 , G 2 , g 1 , e) composed by two groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q, a generator g 1 of G 1 and a cryptographic bilinear map e between G 1 and G 2 . A generator g 2 of group G 2 is obtained by applying e to (g 1 , g 1 ).
BDDH security. An instance generator IG satisfies the Bilinear Decisional DiffieHellman assumption, BDDH, iff for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the advantage of A against BDDH, Adv BDDH A,IG , defined above is negligible in η.
This means that an adversary that is given g and a random group element with negligible probability.
Computational Semantics of Terms
Computational semantics depend on a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (KG, E, D) and of an instance generator IG. In order to transform elements of the second group into keys usable for SE, we assume the existence of a key extractor [CFGP05] algorithm Kex (usually a universal hash function used with the entropy smoothing theorem). We suppose that the distribution of keys generated by KG is equal to the distribution obtained by applying Kex to a random element of G 2 (generated as second group by IG). We associate to each symbolic term t a distribution of bit-strings [[t] ] SE,IG that depends on the security parameter η. This distribution is defined by the following random algorithm:
1. Algorithm IG is used to generate two paired groups G 1 and G 2 of order q and of generators g 1 and g 2 . For each key k from t, a value k is randomly drawn using KG. For each exponent x, a value x is randomly sampled in Z q equipped with the uniform distribution. 2. Then the bit-string evaluation of term t is computed recursively on the structure of t: -If t is a pair (t 1 , t 2 ), the algorithm is applied recursively on t 1 holding bs 1 and on t 2 holding bs 2 . The output of the algorithm is the concatenation of bs 1 and bs 2 . -If t is an encryption {t } k , the algorithm is applied recursively on t holding bs and on k holding bs k . The output of the algorithm is E(bs , bs k ).
, the algorithm is applied recursively on t holding bs and on g p 2 holding bs k . The output of the algorithm is E (bs , Kex(bs k )).
, then the algorithm computes the value n of p in Z q , and the exponentiation of g b to the power of n is returned.
-If t is a key k or an exponent x, then the value t is returned.
Soundness of the Symbolic Model
In this section we prove that the extension of the Abadi-Rogaway logic given in section 3 is computationally sound when implemented using an IND-CPA encryption scheme and using an instance generator satisfying BDDH: if two terms are equivalent up to renaming in the symbolic setting, their evaluations (given by the computational semantics of section 4) are computationally indistinguishable.
Acyclicity Restrictions. The importance of key cycles was already described in [AR00] . In general IND-CPA is not sufficient to prove any soundness result in presence of key cycles, thus as in numerous previous work we forbid the symbolic terms to contain such cycles. (Another possibility to handle key cycles is to consider stronger computational requirements like Key Dependent Message -KDM -security as done in [ABHS05] .) For any well-formed term t, let kp(t) be the set of polynomials p such that g p 2 occurs at a key position in t and g p 2 is not deductible from t. Let dm (t) be the set of monomials x 1 x 2 x 3 such that: -x 1 , x 2 and x 3 occur as plaintexts in t. -x 1 and x 2 occur as plaintexts in t and g x3 1 also appears in t. -x 1 occurs as plaintext in t and g x2 1 and g x3 1 also appear in t. A well-formed term t is acyclic if the two following restrictions are verified.
-For any p in kp(t), p is linearly independent from any other polynomials from pol (t) and from monomials from dm (t), i.e. if pol (t) = {p, p 1 , ..., p n } and dm (t) = {m 1 , ..., m n } then there does not exist any integers a, a 1 to a n and b 1 to b n such that a = 0 and:
b j m j -Let t be term t where each g p 2 for p in kp(t) has been replaced by a fresh key name k. Then there exists an order ≺ among keys such that for any subterm {t } k of t, k can only occur in t if k ≺ k.
Soundness Result
Indistinguishable Distributions. Before giving our soundness result, we recall the usual notion of indistinguishable distributions. Intuitively, two distributions D 1 and D 2 are computationally indistinguishable if for any adversary A, the probability for A to detect the difference between a randomly sampled element of D 1 and a randomly sampled element of D 2 is negligible. Executability in the computational world can easily be obtained from here by applying proposition 4.
Joux Protocol
The Joux protocol has been described in section 2. In an execution of this protocol, three messages are sent, corresponding to terms g . Strong secrecy for this key-exchange protocol has been given as an example for our symbolic equivalence notion:
Proposition 3 can be applied to show that this protocol is secure in the computational setting if the BDDH assumption holds.
We also verify that this protocol is executable. In the symbolic setting this is the case as we have the following deductibility relation:
And similar relation holds when permuting the roles of x 1 and x 2 and of x 1 and x 3 . Thus proposition 4 proves that there exists an efficient algorithm in the computational setting which allows each participant to compute his shared secret key.
TAK-2 and TAK-3 Protocols
The TAK-2 and TAK-3 protocols are two variants of the Joux protocol which were proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in [ARP03] . TAK-1 and TAK-2 are tripartite key-exchange protocols which work in the same way, the only difference lies in the shared key. These protocols uses certificates to provide authentication. However as we are only interested in indistinguishability of the shared key, we use a simplified version of the protocol. Let A, B and C be three participants:
(1) A → B, C : (g In TAK-2, the shared key is g x1x2y3+x1y2x3+y1x2x3 2
. In TAK-3, g x1y2y3+y1x2y3+y1y2x3 2 is used as shared key. Our simplified version of the two protocols are quite close as we do not make any difference between short-term secrets (y 1 , y 2 and y 3 ) and long-term secrets (x 1 , x 2 and x 3 ). Thus in our setting it is sufficient to analyse one of the protocol, TAK-2 for example.
Security. In the symbolic setting, strong secrecy of the key generated by the TAK-2 protocol comes from the following equivalence (up to renaming). Note that the two equivalent terms are well-formed and trivially acyclic: Hence by using proposition 3, we obtain that in the computational setting an adversary that has access to values for g from a random group element, so the adversary is not able to obtain a single bit of information on the shared key.
Executability. We also verify executability of the protocol. By symmetry we consider the case of A. A generates two exponents x 1 and y 1 and receives two messages corresponding to terms (g Thus proposition 4 proves that there exists an efficient algorithm in the computational setting which allows participant A to compute his shared secret key. The same thing holds for B and C.
